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I. INTRODUCTION
In a static and utility-maximizing framework, many existing studies have
analyzed the effects of intergovernmental grants on local public spending
. 2 by examining the implied price substitution and income effects. While
wx Zou 13 has examined some dynamic effects of federal grants on local
public consumption and investment, tax revenues of the federal govern-
ment and local governments are assumed to be constant and the effects of
taxes, grants, and local public spending on private sector’s consumption,
production, and investment are totally ignored. To remedy these deficien-
cies, this paper first presents a model of local economic growth to include
both public and private capital accumulation, spillovers between public
and private sectors, and dynamic budget balance of federal and local
governments. Then, by dividing local public expenditures into public con-
sumption and public investment, it examines how federal income tax, local
 taxes, and intergovernmental grants matching grants for local public
1The main ideas in this paper were suggested by two referees of this journal on my
 . . previous paper H. Zou, Journal of Urban Economics, 36,9 8 ] 115 1994 . Here I acknowledge
their contributions to this paper. I also thank Richard Bird, Jan Brueckner, Hamid Davoodi,
Shantayanan Devarajan, Gunnar Eskeland, Anwar Shah, Danyang Xie, and referees for their
comments and help. All remaining errors are mine. The opinions expressed here are not
necessarily those of the World Bank.
2 wx wx wx wx See Gramlich 5 ; Gramlich and Galper 6 ; Inman 7 ; Mieszkowski and Oakland 8 ;
wx w x Rosen 10 ; and Wilde 11, 12 ; among many others.
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. consumption and investment affect local public investment, private capital
formation, local public consumption, and private consumption.
This approach provides us with a convenient framework to study new
areas of local and urban finance. First, the integration of both grants and
taxes in a dynamic framework offers a different perspective to understand
the interactions among taxes and grants and their general-equilibrium
effects. In this integrated framework, for example, it can be seen more
clearly how incentives for public investment may also become the incen-
tives for private investment, and how budget constraints of the federal and
local governments are consolidated to neutralize the effects of some
federal grants. Second, while the role of public consumption and public
investment in improving private welfare and private capital accumulation
 wx wx has been previously considered Arrow and Kurz 1 , Barro 2 , and
wx . Devarajan et al. 4 , growth implications of local taxes and federal grants
have not been explored in local and urban finance literature. This paper,
built on those contributions, explicitly models the externalities of local
public capital accumulation on private investment and analyzes how local
economic growth responds to various taxes and grants. Thus the model
here is broad and realistic enough to allow us to confront the data and
make empirical assessments on the growth effects of taxes and grants.
I organize this paper as follows. In Section II, I set up a basic model in
which a representative agent’s utility function depends on private con-
sumption and local public consumption, and private sector’s production is
defined on private capital stock and local capital stock. The role of the
federal government is to collect an income tax from the private sector and
to allocate the proceeds to localities through matching grants for local
public consumption and local public investment. A representative local
government collects local taxes and receives grants from the federal
government and optimally chooses its spending on public consumption and
investment; the private sector takes federal government’s and local govern-
. ment’s actions taxes, grants, and public spending as given and optimally
decides how much to consume and invest. In Section III, I examine the
stability and equilibrium of the resulting dynamic system and analyze the
effects of various taxes and grants on the equilibrium values of private
consumption, local public consumption, private investment, and local pub-
lic investment. In Section IV I extend the basic model to a modified
Arrow]Kurz utility function by defining the representative agent’s utility
function on both local public consumption and local public capital stock in
addition to private consumption. Some significant differences between the
basic model and the modified Arrow]Kurz model will be presented. I
conclude this study in Section V by summarizing the main findings and
pointing out some direction for future research.PRIVATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC CAPITAL CONSUMPTION 305
II. THE BASIC MODEL
A representative agent in a typical locality has an increasing, concave,
and continuously differentiable utility function defined on private con-
sumption, c, and local public consumption E:
`
yr t ucq ¨ Ee d t ,0 - r - 1. 1 .  . . H
0
The separability in the utility function greatly simplifies the analysis, but it
is not essential for the results obtained in this paper.
The production function of the representative agent has two inputs:
private capital stock k and local public capital stock k . Let y denote the ps
output, and
y s yk, k .2 . . ps
The production function has the properties y ) 0, y ) 0, y - 0, y - 121 12 2
0, y s y ) 0, and yyy y
2) 0; that is to say, the production 12 21 11 22 12
function is increasing, concave, and continuously differentiable, and, in
particular, local public capital stock is complementary to private capital
stock in the production. The production function also satisfies the usual
Inada conditions: y ª ` as k approaches zero, and y ª 0a sk ap- ii i i
proaches infinity, for i s p and s.
At each time period, the federal government collects an income tax from
the private sector at the rate t ; its expenditures consist of two matching f
grants for local governments: a matching grant for local public investment
. at the rate a 0 - a - 1 and a matching grant for local public consump-
. tion at the rate b 0 - b - 1 . If the federal government’s budget is
always assumed to be balanced, then
˙ t y s ak q bE,3 . fs
˙ where k is the public investment undertaken by a typical local govern- s
ment.
The representative local government collects an income tax at the rate ts
. on the private sector the case of the United States and a consumption tax
 t on private consumption a resemblance to the sales tax collected by c
. 3 local governments in the United States . These tax rates are often set by
the federal governments in many countries and cannot be chosen by local
governments, or in the United States, they are chosen by local govern-
3All tax rates in this paper are exogenous parameters. The optimal choices of tax rates and
wx grants will not be considered in this paper; see Zou 14 for a study on the optimal design of
federal grants to localities.HENG-FU ZOU 306
ments and cannot be often changed by local governments. The total
revenue of a typical local government consists of a local income tax, a
consumption tax, and two matching grants from the federal government;
˙ its expenditures are public consumption, E, and public investment, k . s
Therefore its budget constraint is
˙˙ t yk, k q tc q a kq b E s kq E ,4 . . sp s c s s
or
y1 ˙ k s t yk, k q tc y1 y bE 1 y a .5 . .  . . ss p sc
The representative agent’s budget constraint is given by the condition
that the after-tax income is equal to the total spending on private con-
˙ . sumption, 1 q t c, and private investment, k : c p
˙ k s 1 y t y t yk, k y1 q t c .6 .  .  . . pf s p s c
I first look at the optimization in the private sector. Taking the time
paths of local public consumption E, local public capital stock k , and s
. taxes as given, the representative agent maximizes 1 by choosing private
consumption c and private capital stock kp
`
yr t Max ucq ¨ Ee d t ,0 - r - 1. 1 .  . . H
. c , k 0 p
. subject to the budget constraint in 6 .
The current-value Hamiltonian function for the representative agent is
Hc , k, l s ucq ¨ Eq l 1 y ty t yk, k y1 q t c, .  .  .  . .  . pp p f s ps c
7 .
where l is the costate variable. p
. The necessary conditions for the optimization are given by 6 and
u9 c .
c s 1 y ty t yk , ky r ,8 .  . ˙ . fs 1 p s y u 0 c .
plus the transversality condition
lim u9 c 1 q t ke
y r ts 0. .  . cp
t ª `
Similarly, the optimal conditions for the representative local government
can be derived. The local government is assumed to maximize the repre-PRIVATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC CAPITAL CONSUMPTION 307
sentative agent’s welfare by choosing E and k while taking the time paths s
of c, k , grants, and taxes as given, or p
`
yr t Max ucq ¨ Ee d t ,0 - r - 1, 1 .  . . H
. E , k 0 s
. subject to the budget constraint 5 .
The current-value Hamiltonian function for the local government is
HE , k , l sucq ¨ E q lt yk, k q tc y1 y bE .  .  .  . . ss s s ps c
y 1 1 y a,9 .  .
where l is the costate variable. s
. The optimal conditions for the local government’s optimization are 5
¨9 E . y 1 ˙ E s t 1 y a yk , ky r ,1 0 .  . . s2 p s y ¨ 0 E .
and the transversality condition is
y1 yrt lim ¨9 E 1 y b 1 y a ke s 0. .  .  . s
t ª `
In this model, the federal government has been assigned the simple
roles of a tax collector and a grantor, because nation-wide public consump-
tion and public investment are excluded from the model. To include these
federal expenditures into the model is straightforward, but it is analytically
difficult to deal with six differential equations at the same time.
To complete the model setup, it is necessary to integrate the federal
. government’s budget constraint 3 into the necessary conditions for opti-
˙ . . mization. That can be done easily. Substituting Eq. 3 for ak in Eq. 4 s
leads to an integrated budget constraint for the federal and local govern-
ments
˙ k s t q t yk, k q tc y E ,1 1 .  . . ss fp sc
˙ which says that all tax revenues are allocated to local public investment ks
and local public consumption E.
. ..  . Equations 8 , 10 , 6 , and 11 compose a complete dynamic system in
the four endogenous variables of the model: private consumption, public
consumption, private capital, and public capital. This dynamic system is the
focus of the analysis in the next section.HENG-FU ZOU 308
III. ANALYSIS
. ..  . P ROPOSITION 1. The dynamic system in Eqs.8 ,1 0 ,6 , and 11 has a
unique equilibrium.
˙˙ ˙ Proof. At any equilibrium, c s E s k s k s 0. Then, the dynamic ˙ ps
system is reduced to
1 y t y t yk , ky r s 0, 12 .  . / fs 1 p s
y 1 t 1 y a yk , ky r s 0, 13 .  . / s2 p s
1 y t y t yk, k y1 q t c s 0, 14 .  .  . / fs p s c
t q t yk, k q tc y E s 0, 15 .  . / sf p s c
where c, E, k , and k denote the steady-state values of private consump- ps
tion, public consumption, private capital, and public capital, respectively.
. . 2  In 12 and 13 , since yyy y) 0 as a result of the concavity of 11 22 12
. the production function , the equilibrium values, k and k , can be solved ps
uniquely as the functions of parameters t , t , r, and a by the implicit sf
function theorem. Then, with the uniqueness of k and k , c is unique ps
. from Eq. 14 . Similarly, with the uniqueness of k , k , and c, the unique ps
. solution for E is given by Eq. 15 . Q.E.D.
PROPOSITION 2. There exists a unique perfect-foresight path in this dy-
namic system.
Proof. See the Appendix.
With the uniqueness of the equilibrium and its stability, I proceed to
study the comparative dynamics regarding the effects of various taxes and
grants on the long-run accumulation of capital stocks. Totally differentiate
. . the equilibrium conditions 12 ] 15 :
00 1 y t y t y 1 y t y t yd c . . fs 1 1 fs 1 2
y 1 y 1 00 t 1 y a y t 1 y a yd E . . s2 1 s2 2
y 1 q t 01 y t y t y1 y t y t yd k .  . . cf s 1 f s 2 p
t y 1 t q t y t q t yd k . . cf s 1 f s 2 s
yd tq yd t 1f 1s
y 2 y yd t y t1 y a yd a . 2s s 2 s .1 6 .
yd t qyd t qcd t fsc
y yd t yyd t ycd t fscPRIVATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC CAPITAL CONSUMPTION 309
. From 16 , it is simple to note two implications:
First, a rise in the federal income tax rate t reduces private capital f
stock, local public capital stock, and private consumption in the long run.
Its effect on local public consumption is ambiguous. These results can be
explained as follows: while a higher federal income tax reduces the
after-tax returns on private investment and leads to a lower private capital
accumulation, it also reduces local public investment because a smaller
 private capital stock lowers the productivity of public capital note that
. .  . yk , k ) 0 . Since private consumption is given by 14 , a rise in t 12 p s f
. reduces consumption both directly through a reduced after-tax income
 and indirectly through a reduced before-tax income as a result of lower
. private and public capital stocks . The effect on public consumption is
ambiguous because, while a higher federal income tax leads to a smaller
consumption tax, t c, it may raise or lower the income tax t y. This cf
. ambiguity can be seen directly from Eq. 15 , or
E s t yk, k q tyk, k q tc .1 7 . // fp s sp s c
. On the right-hand side of Eq. 17 , the second and the third terms are
reduced as a result of a higher federal income tax, but the first term may
 be higher or lower the familiar property of the Laffer curve for income
. tax or inflation tax .
Second, a rise in the federal matching grant for local public investment
leads to more local public capital stock, more private capital stock, and
more private and public consumption in the long run. The reason for these
results is simple. The federal matching grant for local public investment
creates more incentive for the local government to undertake more invest-
ment and accumulate more public capital stock, which in turn improves
the productivity of private investment. Thus, in the long run, both local
public capital and private capital are increased as a result of a higher
federal matching grant for local public investment. As both private and
local public capital stocks increase after the rise in the federal matching
grant for local public investment, more output is produced and more
private consumption obtained. Local public consumption also increases
because more income tax and more consumption tax are collected with the
rise in private production and private consumption.
Now I turn to a few results which are not so obvious from the model.
PROPOSITION 3. A rise in the local income tax rate t has ambiguous s
effects on pri¨ate capital stock, local public capital stock, pri¨ate consump-
tion, and local public consumption in the long run.HENG-FU ZOU 310
. This proposition can be verified by using Cramer’s rule in 16 ,
y1 dk t 1 y a yy q 1 y t y ty .  . ps 2 2 1 f s 1 2
s ,1 8 . y 1 2 d t 1 y t y tt1 y a yyy y .  . s fs s 1 1 2 21 2
y 1 dk yt 1 y a yy y 1 y t y tyy .  . ss 1 2 1 f s 2 1 1
s ,1 9 . y 1 2 d t 1 y t y tt1 y a yyy y .  . s fs s 1 1 2 21 2
which do not have definite signs because the numerators can be positive or
negative while the common denominator is always positive. As for both
private and public consumption, their ambiguities follow the ambiguities of
the capital stock and output.
The economic intuition for this result is the following: the direct impact
of a rise in the local income tax is a reduction in private investment and an
increase in local public investment. But the rising public investment also
stimulates private investment due to the fact that these two capital inputs
are complementary in production. Thus, the net effect of a rise in the local
income tax on output production is not clear. Proposition 3 leads to a
similar issue regarding the optimal local income tax for financing local
wx public investment as found in different contexts by Barro 2 and
wx Devarajan et al. 4 . Essentially, due to the externality of local public
capital on private production, a small income tax as a way of financing
local public investment is always justified. But when the income tax rate is
rising above a certain point, the corresponding disincentive for private
production will outweigh the benefits of public capital formation. Natu-
rally, the optimal choice of a local income tax schedule can be determined
by the cost]benefit analysis in a dynamic growth model similar to that in
this paper.
PROPOSITION 4. In the long run, the federal matching grant for local
public consumption has no effect on pri¨ate capital stock, local public capital
accumulation, pri¨ate consumption, and local public consumption.
To show this result, I first point out that both private and public capital
stocks are independent of the federal matching grant for local public
. . consumption in the long run as in the steady-state equations 12 and 13 .
Once the long-run public capital stock is determined, the spending on the
long-run local public consumption is decided as a residual.
This result is quite counter-intuitive. In general, we expect that a rise in
the federal matching grant for local public consumption would lead to
locality to divert more local resources from public investment to consump-
tion. This conclusion is a fact which can be derived from many staticPRIVATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC CAPITAL CONSUMPTION 311
models on local government spending. But what we usually expect does not
hold in the long-run analysis based on a sound dynamic structure. In
particular, I want to draw attention to the surprising conclusion that this
matching grant does not even change local public consumption in the long
run. To put it in a policy context, we may question the effectiveness of
many federal incentive programs for local welfare and public consumption.
In the long run, a matching grant for investment turns out to be more
effective in providing more local public consumption than a matching
grant for consumption.
PROPOSITION 5. An increase in the local consumption tax has no effect on
the long-run capital stocks, but it reduces pri¨ate consumption and raises local
public consumption.
That local consumption tax has no effect on the long-run accumulation
of both private and local public capital can be seen directly from the
. . steady-state equations 12 and 13 , because the local consumption tax
does not appear in these two equations, which determine the long-run
.  capital stocks. Then, from Eq. 14 , as the after-tax income, 1 y t y f
. . t yk, k , is fixed, consumption has to be reduced corresponding to a sp s
rise in the consumption tax. With a higher consumption tax, local public
. consumption will increase and its magnitude can be derived from Eq. 15 :
dErdt s c ) 0. Therefore, a local consumption tax only reallocates a c
given amount of resources between the private sector and public sector
and cannot stimulate either private or public capital accumulation in the
long run.
IV. THE MODIFIED ARROW]KURZ UTILITY FUNCTION
It should be emphasized that many results derived in Sections II and III
. above depend on the commonly accepted utility function defined in 1 .
But if the utility function is defined on both local public consumption and
 local public capital in addition to private consumption a suggestion from
wx . Arrow and Kurz 1 ,l then, in the long run, the federal matching grant for
local public consumption and a local consumption tax do affect the
long-run accumulation of both private and public capital. To make this
point clear, let me first extend the model setup to include the Arrow]Kurz
utility function
`
yr t ucq ¨ Eq wk e d t ,0 - r - 1, 20 .  .  .  . H s
0
. where wk represents the utility from the services of local public capital s
stock. The dynamic budget constraints for the representative agent, the
. local government, and the federal government remain the same as Eqs. 6 ,HENG-FU ZOU 312
. . 5 , and 3 , respectively. The necessary conditions for optimization are
.. . modified to be Eqs. 8 , 6 , 11 , and
¨9 E . y 1 ˙ E s t 1 y a yk , ky r . . s2 p s y ¨ 0 E .
w 9 k . s y 1 q 1 y b1 y a .2 1 . .  .
y ¨ 0 E .
. Now, the dynamic system differs from that previous only in Eq. 21 . It
wx can be shown as in Arrow and Kurz 1 that, unlike the model in Sections
II and III, there may exist multiple equilibria here, so that the nice
properties of the unique equilibrium of the previous model disappear with
. the introduction of wk into the utility function. That is to say, Proposi- s
tions 1 and 2 do not hold any more in the new model. With multiple
equilibria, it is necessary to choose a saddle-point equilibrium to linearize
the dynamic system above, which amounts to assuming that, at some
. equilibrium state, c, E, k , k , out of the possible few, the 4 = 4 matrix, ps
denoted as M9, has a positive determinant D9. This is to guarantee that
there exists a unique perfect foresight path in the neighborhood of this
equilibrium. With this assumption, the comparative equilibrium analysis
can proceed as usual.
In this selected saddle-point equilibrium, the equilibrium conditions of
. . . the new dynamic system are 12 , 14 , 15 , and
y1 y1 t 1ya yk , k¨ 9 E y ¨ 9 E r q w 9 k 1 y b1 y a s 0.  . . .  .  . . / s2 p s s
22 .
The difference between these equilibrium conditions and those previous is
. . that Eq. 13 has been changed to Eq. 22 here, which implies that the
y1 . .  . marginal benefit of local public investment, t 1 y a yk , k¨ 9 E q s2 p s
y 1 .  .  . w 9 k1 y b1 y a , equals the marginal cost of the foregone local s
. public consumption, ¨9 E r.
With the new utility function, Propositions 4 and 5 are not true any
more. In fact:
PROPOSITION 6. With the Arrow]Kurz utility function, an increase in the
federal matching grant for local public consumption reduces local public
. capital, pri¨ate capital, pri¨ate consumption, and e¨en surprisingly local
public consumption in the long run.PRIVATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC CAPITAL CONSUMPTION 313
. . . . Proof. Totally differentiate 12 , 22 , 14 , and 15 :
00 1 y t y t y 1 y t y t y . . fs 1 1 fs 1 2
1 y b y 1 y 1 y 1 0 t 1 y a y y r ¨ 0 t 1 y a y ¨ 9 t 1 y a y ¨ 9 q w 0 . . . s2s2 1 s2 2 1 y a
y 1 q t 01 y t y t y 1 y t y t y .  .  . cf s 1 f s 2






yd tq yd t 1f 1s
y 1 y 2 y 2 y 1 y y 1 y a ¨ 9 d t y t 1 y ay ¨ 9 q 1 y b w 9 1 y a d a q 1 y aw 9 d b . . . . . 2s s 2 s .
yd t qyd t qcd t fsc
y yd t yyd t ycd t fsc
23 .
. Using Cramer’s rule in 23 yields
dkp y1 y1 sy w9 k 1ya D0 1 q t 1 y t y t yk , k - 0, .  . .  . . / sc f s 1 2 p s d b
24 .
dks y1 y1 s w9 k 1 y a D0 1 q t 1 y t y t yk , k- 0, .  . .  . . / sc f s 1 1 p s d b
25 .
where D0 is positive by the assumption of a perfect-foresight equilibrium
.  at c, E, k , k , because D0 is just the product of the four eigenvalues two ps
. positive and two negative for perfect-foresight equilibrium multiplied by a
positive number.
Then, private consumption will be reduced as a result of lower capital
. stocks and a lower output from Eq. 14 . Similarly, the long-run local
public consumption is reduced because of a smaller output tax and a
. smaller consumption tax as in Eq. 15 . Q.E.D.
Proposition 6 combined with Proposition 4 provides some strong indica-
tion about the effects of a matching grant for local public consumption. In
the short run, a matching grant for local public consumption always
stimulates public consumption and reduces public investment. In the long
run, it either has no effect on the accumulation of private and public
. capital when the utility function is independent of local public capital orHENG-FU ZOU 314
reduces both private and public capital stocks with the Arrow]Kurz utility
function. Furthermore, in the long run, a federal matching grant for local
public consumption has either no effect or negative effect on the equilib-
rium level of local public consumption.
PROPOSITION 7. With the modified Arrow]Kurz utility function, a rise in
the consumption tax leads to more pri¨ate capital and more local public
capital.
. Proof. In 23 ,
dks y1 y1 sy D0 1yt yt yk , kt 1 y a y y r ¨ 0 E ) 0, . .  .  . / fs 1 1 p s s 2 d t c
w . y 1 x which is positive because the term t 1 y a y y r has to be negative s2
. for the equilibrium condition in 22 to be maintained. The rise in private
capital stock follows:
dk rdt sy yy d k r d t) 0. Q.E.D. . pc 1 1 1 1sc
Proposition 6 stands in sharp contrast to Proposition 5 in the previous
section. Without the Arrow]Kurz utility function, Proposition 5 has shown
that long-run capital stocks are independent of consumption tax. With the
Arrow]Kurz utility function, the rising local government’s revenue as a
result of a higher consumption tax will be allocated to both local public
consumption and local investment in both the short run and the long run.
. Unlike equilibrium condition 13 where long-run local public capital does
not depend on the utility from local public consumption, the new equilib-
. rium condition of 22 underlies the balance between local public invest-
ment and local public consumption. In particular, if a higher consumption
tax only gives rise to a rise in local public consumption, the marginal utility
from the unchanged local public capital stock will be higher as seen clearly
. from Eq. 22 . To maintain this equilibrium condition, more local revenue
will be invested in local public capital accumulation. As local public capital
stock increases, the marginal productivity of private investment also rises.
Therefore, all capital stocks and output in the long run will be higher as a
result of a higher consumption tax.
V. SUMMARY
In a modified optimal growth model with both private and local public
capital accumulation, this paper has made a preliminary attempt to exam-
ine how federal and local income taxes, local consumption tax, and federal
matching grants for local public consumption and local public investment
. affect the long-run equilibrium equilibria of private consumption, private
capital accumulation, local public consumption, and local public capital
stock. The main findings are summarized in Table 1 according to the twoPRIVATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC CAPITAL CONSUMPTION 315
TABLE 1
Long-Run Effect of Taxes and Grants
Exogenous variables
ttta b fsc Endogenous
.  . .  . .  . .  . .  . variables i ii i ii i ii i ii i ii
k }}??0qqq 0 } p
k }}??0qqq 0 } s
c }}??}? qq 0 }
E ???? qqqq0}
.  . definitions of the utility function, where columns i and ii report the
results corresponding to the usual utility function and the Arrow]Kurz
utility function, respectively.
Theoretically, both types of preferences are reasonable even though it is
more often the case that the utility function is defined in private and
public consumption. Since the implications of various policies are so
different as a result of these two specifications of preferences, the issues
can only be settled empirically in future studies.
APPENDIX: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
I need to show that there are two positive eigenvalues and two negative
eignevalues corresponding to the two jumping variables, c and E, and the
wx two state variables, k and k ; see Buiter 3 . Linearizing the four differen- ps
tial equations of the dynamic system around the steady-state values,
u9 u9 . .
c 00 1 y t y t y 1 y t y t y . . ˙ fs 1 1 fs 1 2 y u 0 y u 0 . .
¨ 9 ¨ 9 . . y 1 y 1 ˙ s E 00 t 1 y a y t 1 y a y . . s2 1 s2 2 y ¨ 0 y ¨ 0 . .
˙ k y1 q t 01 y t y t y 1 y t y t y .  .  . pc f s 1 f s 2
˙ k t y 1 t q t y t q t y . . sc f s 1 f s 2
c y c
= . A1 E y E .
k y k pp
k y k ss
. Let M denote the 4 = 4 matrix in A1 and let l , l , l , and l denote 123 4
the four eigenvalues of this dynamic system. It is well known that theHENG-FU ZOU 316
product of these four eigenvalues equals the determinant of matrix M
. denoted as D
u9 c ¨9 E .  . y 1 lllls D s t 1 q t 1 y a 1 y ty t . .  . 1234 s c f s u 0 c .¨ 0E .
2 yyy y ) 0, A2 . 11 22 12
which is to say, there are three possibilities: no negative eigenvalue, two
negative eigenvalues, or four negative eigenvalues. But, the sum of the
four eigenvalues is equal to the trace of matrix M, which turns out to be
positive:
l q l q l q l s 1 y t y t yk , kqt q tyk , k) 0. .  . / / 1234 f s 1 p s f s 2 p s
A3 .
. . Therefore, at least one eigenvalue is positive. Combining A2 with A3
 narrows down the possibilities to two: either no negative eigenvalue all
. four eigenvalues are positive or two negative eigenvalues. To show that
the latter is true, I need the condition that the product, lllq lll 123 124
q lllq lll, equals the sum of all principal minors of order three 134 234
in matrix M. Some tedious calculation yields
lllq lllq lllq lll 123 124 134 234
¨ 9 E . y 1 wx s t 1 y a 1 y t y t yy y yy .  . sf s 1 2 2 2 2 1 ¨ 0 E .
u 9 c .
q 1 y ty t 1 q tt q t yy .  .  . fs c fs 1 1 2 u 0 c .
y t1 y ty t yy y yy ytq t yy , .  .  . c f s 2 11 1 12 f s 2 11
which is negative. Thus, at least one eigenvalue is negative. With the
results regarding the determinant and the trace of matrix M, the only
possibility is that there are two negative eigenvalues and two positive
eigenvalues, or stated differently, there exists a unique perfect foresight
equilibrium in this dynamic system. Q.E.D.
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